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Abstract
In this paper we challenge the conventional view that strikes are caused by asymmetric
information regarding rm protability such that union members are uninformed. Instead,
we build an expressive model of strikes where the perception of unfairness provides the
expressive benet of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases
both wage o¤ers and the incidence of strikes. Furthermore, while asymmetric information
is still important in causing strikes, we nd that it is the employer who is not fully informed
about the level of emotionality within the union, thereby contributing to strike incidence.
An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union
size has a positive e¤ect on the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions even when
asymmetric information regarding protability is controlled for.
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1 Introduction
There is a general consensus in the literature on strikes that they are caused by asymmetric
information. The union overestimates the protability of their employers and demands too
high a wage. This leads to a strike, which lasts until the union settles for a lower wage. The
strike serves an economic function because if the union were never to strike, the employer
would always o¤er the lowest possible wage. This consensus view is reected in the dictionary
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review of the topic by Kennan (2008), and it is also the prevailing explanation given in the
brief textbook discussion by Borjas (2006) and the survey by Cramton and Tracy (2002).
The literature that these surveys refer to tends to be much older and started to fade in the
early 1990s (key references are Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969, Kennan 1986, and Card 1990).
Two reasons could reasonably be posited for the decline in interest in strikes. First, they are
rare events and have become increasingly rare from the 1990s onwards.1 Second, asymmetric
information seemed to provide the clearest answer to the Hicks paradox (i.e., the paradox
of ine¢ cient lost surplus) so that the theoretical debate appeared settled. The work on the
origins of strikes can also be tied to more general work on the causes of conict. Fearon (1995)
famously argued that (if we ignore irrationality) there are only three factors which can bring
about ine¢ cient conict: commitment problems, indivisibilities, and asymmetric information.
The rst two potential explanations are not really plausible as features of strikes, which leaves
asymmetric information as an explanation.
This paper takes a fresh look at strikes theoretically and empirically by incorporating
developments in economics and political economics that have taken place since the 1990s.
These developments are the theory of expressive voting in political economics, and the theory
of fairness within behavioural economics. We believe that the literature on strikes was dying
before the emergence of these theories, and that it is now time to revisit strikes in the light
that they provide. These concepts broaden the traditional narrow view of rationality and thus
could be viewed as rationalising a possible fourth explanation for conict given by Fearon,
namely irrationality. We still argue that asymmetric information is crucial in causing strikes,
but in a very di¤erent way to the standard explanation: in our approach, the employer is not
fully informed about the level of emotionality or expressiveness among union members.
Expressive voting acknowledges the fact that when voting in elections (and a union ballot
is, of course, in e¤ect an election), the probability of being decisive in determining the outcome
is less than one, and as the size of the electorate becomes larger the probability of being
decisive approaches zero. This matters because it may undermine the standard idea that
union members vote purely out of indirect instrumental interest. Union members may in fact
receive a greater direct expressive benet of voting for a strike. This direct expressive benet
can outweigh the potentially signicant costs of strikes occurring, because these costs are
discounted by the very low probability of being decisive in determining the outcome.2 The
link between expressiveness and strikes was recognised by Glazer (1992) in a paper that clearly
inuences the analysis conducted here. He argued that if union members are emotional, they
1See e.g., Simms and Charlwood (2010) on unions and industrial action in the UK, and Bennett and
Kaufman (2007) for the United States.
2The literature on expressive voting spans several decades and is both theoretically and empirically rich.
Although the idea was not new, its signicance for democratic decision-making reached a wide audience with
the publication of Brennan and Lomasky (1994). For a discussion and comprehensive survey, see Hamlin and
Jennings (2011).
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may vote for a strike on emotional grounds, even though they would not have done so if they
were choosing purely instrumentally. They are free to choose emotionally because their vote
is highly unlikely to determine the outcome of a ballot.
While Glazer bases his expressive theory of voting for strikes on emotional payo¤s, he
does not provide a formal foundation for them. The analysis presented here aims to do that
by tying the emotional payo¤ from voting for a strike to the theory of fairness developed by
Rabin (1993).3 In Rabins theory, as long as the costs are not too high, individuals will be
willing to hurt individuals that hurt them or, more positively, make sacrices for individuals
that make sacrices for them. This can explain cooperation in a one-shot prisonersdilemma,
but also, from a negative welfare perspective, the failure to coordinate in the Battle of the
Sexes. A key feature of Rabins theory is that the stakes must be low. As soon as they
become high, psychologicalpayo¤s will be swamped by material payo¤s and the standard
predictions would apply. Decisions made by voting (or collective action more generally) turn
high material stakes into low material stakes. Therefore, it could be that a collective decision
leads to a highly ine¢ cient decision being made (for example a strike) because ex ante the
union members correctly perceive that their probability of determining the outcome of the
election is very small. Thus, for each individual union member the decision in the ballot
concerns low material stakes, although ex post the material stakes may be extremely high
in terms of lost income and other e¤ects. The material stakes ex ante will become smaller
the larger the size of the union, as this further reduces the probability of being decisive, and
fairness concerns will play a larger relative role in the calculus of voting.
In our theoretical model combining fairness concerns (following Rabin) and expressiveness,
we demonstrate how fairness concerns are incorporated into two-person employer/employee
bargaining over a wage. We see that the equilibrium wage will be higher than if the fairness
concerns were absent. That is, the employee would be willing to hurt him or herself to hurt
the employer through a strike, but only if the wage o¤ered by the employer is close to the
employees reservation wage. At higher wage o¤ers, although the employee may nd the o¤er
unfair, the costs of striking are too high and a strike will therefore not occur. We then extend
the analysis to group voting on whether to strike or not. As the union size becomes larger
and psychological payo¤s receive greater weight relative to material payo¤s, the model makes
two predictions. First, wages will grow with union size. Second, strikes are more likely with
increasing union size.
As stated earlier, we believe that asymmetric information still lies at the heart of the
explanation for strikes, but we argue that it now acts in the opposite direction: from the
employer towards the employees. If the employer had full knowledge about the exact level of
emotionality within the union, she would set the wage at the lowest level that would avoid a
strike. However, she is likely not to have this knowledge, and as a result may underestimate
3Godard (1992) informally also makes the point that strikes can be due to perceptions of unfairness.
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emotionality and o¤er a wage which is too low, such that union members vote for strike action.
This can happen even though there is no asymmetric information regarding the protability
of the rm, as is the case for example for publicly listed companies.
We test our theoretical predictions using UK data gathered in the Workplace Employment
Relations Survey 2004 (Department of Trade and Industry 2005a). The results show that one
type of asymmetric information, i.e., a lack of knowledge by managers of union members
attitude proxied by a trust mismatch between the two sides does tend to be linked to a
higher incidence of industrial action. Most importantly, we nd that even when controlling for
classical" asymmetric information regarding protability, union size is positively and signi-
cantly associated with higher average wages in a rm and increased industrial action incidence.
While the former result could arguably also be explained by the e¤ects of union (bargaining)
power,4 the latter is a novel nding and strongly suggests that expressive behaviour can help
us understand the occurrence of strikes and other types of industrial action.
As mentioned above, strikes and industrial actions in general are relatively rare events.
However, it does not follow that the analysis of their origins has become irrelevant: when
strikes happen, they are often very big news. A recent high-prole example is the 2009
to 2011 dispute between British Airways (BA) and the Unite" union. The protability of
BA was common knowledge, substantially weakening the argument for classic asymmetric
information as a reason for striking. Instead, the strike seemed to have much more to do
with the tough stance taken by BAs chief executive Willie Walsh, which provoked an angry
emotional response within the Unite union and led to the subsequent votes for strike action. By
May 2011, when agreement was reached, the replacement of Willie Walsh with Keith Williams
appears to have been a central factor in achieving compromise. In terms of the model and
empirical study presented here, the BA dispute represents a situation where a strike occurs
despite symmetric information about the protability of the rm, being instead triggered
by a perception on the part of the union of employer unfairness. Given that an individual
members vote was unlikely to determine the outcome of the strike ballot, a majority of union
members may have voted expressively for strike action. It is doubtful whether the majority
would have done so if their individual vote had been decisive, given the severe consequences
of strike action in terms of potential disciplinary measures and the e¤ect on the protability
of their company. When a new employer arrived o¤ering what was perceived by the majority
as a fair o¤er, the strike was averted.5
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its main
predictions; Section 3 describes the data and results from the empirical analysis; and Section
4 concludes.
4See e.g., Simms and Charlwood (2010), who also o¤er a critique of the use of union size as an e¤ective
measure of union power.
5The BBC website provides a good source of information on the BA dispute. See
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13373638 and the links attached within that article.
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2 The Model
Let us consider a rm and union that undergo negotiations over a union wage. We simplify
the analysis by assuming the rm to be of a xed size in terms of the number of workers and
its revenue is xed at p per worker. The employers prots are given by p   w per worker
where w is the wage paid out to each worker. The negotiation over a wage o¤er involves a rm
selecting a wage within the interval w 2 [0; p], which a subset of the workers who are members
of the union decide to either accept or reject through a vote to (not) strike. If a strike does
not occur, payo¤s are w and p w, for each worker and the rm, respectively. In the event
of a strike, payo¤s for all actors are normalised to zero. While we hold the size of workforce
to be xed, we allow the number of workers that are unionised to be variable. As union size
becomes larger, the probability of any single union member determining whether there is a
strike or not becomes smaller. This would increase the weight on expressive concerns relative
to instrumental concerns, provided that expressive concerns exist. The extent to which union
members are expressive is known to the members, but is not known to the employer. The
model presented in this section advances the work by Glazer (1992) by being precise about
the content of an expressive choice. We do this by grounding it in Rabins (1993) theory of
fairness. As an application in his paper, Rabin discusses the extent to which concerns with
fairness prevent a monopolist from being able to extract the full surplus from the consumer.
Above a certain price, the consumer would prefer to punish the monopolist (and herself) by
not purchasing a good that would have generated positive material benets, both for the
consumer and the monopolist. We adapt this application to the setting of wage negotiations
between an employer and a union.
2.1 A theory of fairness
We show how the inclusion of concerns about fairness a¤ects wage determination in negotia-
tions between an employer and the union, such that wage demands are higher than if there
were no concern for fairness, and that the employer will agree to these higher demands. We
then introduce expressiveness and demonstrate that this may amplify the concern for fairness,
which in turn further increases wage demands. If the employer cannot perfectly predict the
expressiveness of the union members, she may underestimate its realised value and o¤er too
low a wage and thus cause a strike, which arises out of a sense of unfairness. When union
size is small and wage demands are small, the rm is more likely to set the wage at the level
demanded by potentially highly expressive union members, thus avoiding the possibility of a
strike. As union size becomes larger and wage demands rise, the employer is likely to set the
wage at a level that would be demanded by a more moderately expressive union. In doing so,
however, the employer is more likely to incur a strike. The model gives three main predictions
that can be tested empirically. First, as union size increases the average wage increases. Sec-
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ond, as union size increases the probability of a strike increases. Third, strikes are more likely
where there is a lack of communication and trust between the employer and union members,
in line with the idea that asymmetric information on the employers side with regard to the
union memberspreferences plays a key role.
We rst summarise the Rabin approach to modelling fairness. From a material two-player
game, a psychological game is derived which will determine each players psychological utility.
This will depend on three factors. Player 1s strategy (a1) depends on her belief about the
strategy of player 2 (b2) ; and her belief about player 2s belief regarding her strategy (c1) .
A similar description applies to player 2.
We derive a kindness function for player 1, f1 (a1; b2) and player 1s perception of player
2s kindness ef2 (b2; c1). These are expressed as follows
f1 (a1; b2) =
2 (a1; b2)  fair2 (b2)
max2 (b2)  min2 (b2)
(1)
and ef2 (b2; c1) = 1 (c1; b2)  fair1 (c1)
max1 (c1)  min1 (c1)
(2)
where 2 (a1; b2) is the payo¤ received by player 2 given that player 2 chooses strategy b2 and
player 1 chooses strategy a1. 
fair
2 (b2) is dened as
[h2 (b2)+l2(b2)]
2 and refers to the mid-point
between the highest and lowest (Pareto e¢ cient) payo¤s player 1 could give to player 2 given
that player 2 plays strategy b2: If the numerator is positive, player 1 is being kind to player
2. If it is negative, player 1 is being unkind, and if it is zero player 1s behaviour is neutral
in terms of kindness. The function f1 is weighted by the maximum payo¤ player 1 could give
player 2, minus the lowest possible payo¤ (now including possibly Pareto ine¢ cient payo¤s)
that player 1 could give player 2 given their choice of b2. A Pareto ine¢ cient payo¤ obviously
means playing a strategy that will make both parties worse o¤ compared to an alternative
available strategy open to player 1. The function ff2 is analogous to f1 and measures player
1s perception of player 2s kindness towards her, given her belief that player 2 believes she is
playing strategy c1. Analogous functions f2 and ff1 are derived in the same way for player 2.
It will become clear below how these payo¤s are depicted for the game we are analysing.
The following utility function for player 1 is assumed, which incorporates material and
psychological payo¤s
U1 (a1; b2; c1) = 1 (a1; b2) + ef2 (b2; c1) [1 + f1 (a1; b2)] (3)
and similarly for U2 (a2; b1; c2). 1 refers to the material payo¤ and ef2 [1 + f1] refers to the
psychological payo¤. We can see from the psychological payo¤ that if player 1 believes that
player 2 is unkind
 ef2 < 0, then the psychological payo¤would be maximised by choosing to
be unkind towards player 2 (f1 < 0). The reverse is true if player 2 is perceived as being kind.
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If player 2 is perceived as being neutral
 ef2 = 0 then the psychological payo¤ is irrelevant.
Note though that the possibility of the psychological payo¤ altering behaviour is dependent
upon the material payo¤being relatively small. A contribution of this paper is to demonstrate
how a high-stakes material game such as a strike can be converted into a game in which these
stakes are reduced and psychological payo¤s can change behaviour.
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
We now apply the Rabin model to a setting of wage negotiations between an employer and a
union. Assume initially that the union is represented by only one member so that he or she is
completely decisive in negotiations with the employer. The employer picks w 2 [0; p] and the
union representative then picks r 2 [0; p] : If r > w then there is a strike and the payo¤ is zero
for both parties. If r  w the payo¤s are w and p w for the workers and rm, respectively.
First, let us consider what would happen in a world without fairness concerns where workers
and employers are purely materially motivated. If we rule out weakly dominated strategies,
choosing 0 is a dominant strategy for the union representative, so w = 0 is the predicted
outcome of the game.
2.3 Fairness Equilibrium
We rst assume only one union representative and thus no expressiveness because the rep-
resentative is decisive in determining the outcome. What is the lowest wage consistent with
a fairness equilibrium? Given the employer sets w, she can get p   w or 0. If r  w then
the union representative maximises both his and the employers payo¤, and from (1) we can
see that funion = 0. By choosing any r  w the employer receives a payo¤ of p   w: Thus
there is only one e¢ cient payo¤ for the employer, namely p   w. If r > w then the union
representative minimises the payo¤ of both parties to zero (thus choosing a Pareto ine¢ cient
payo¤, given that an e¢ cient payo¤ would have been available if r  w had been chosen), so
funion =  1. The employer will never feel positively towards the employee, because even if
the union asks for a wage lower than the one that the rm o¤ers, they will still receive w and
thus all o¤ers of r  w are in the material interest of the union as well as the employer. For
this reason the employer will never o¤er w > r. So in a fairness equilibrium w = r. Would
the union representative wish to deviate and choose r > w ? If so,
Uunion = 0 + femployer [1  1] = 0; (4)
and by choosing r = w
Uunion = w + femployer [1 + 0] : (5)
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To solve we need rst to solve for femployer (how kind the rm is being towards the worker,
from (2)):
femployer =
w   12 (w + p)
p
=
w   p
2p
: (6)
femployer is clearly negative because the employer o¤ers the lowest possible wage that she can
that avoids a strike. Plugging (6) into (5) and setting equal to (4), we see that
w =
p
2p+ 1
> 0: (7)
This is the lowest wage the rm could o¤er that would avoid a strike. Clearly the wage in the
fairness equilibrium is higher than in the Nash equilibrium, reecting the concern for fairness.
Note though that in this limited case where we assume only one union representative, so that
she is completely decisive when determining whether there is a strike or not, the wage agreed
is still very small as a proportion of p, as p becomes large. This makes sense: it tells us that
when revenues are very high, an individual representative would nd it too costly materially
to ght for the same share of the revenue as when revenues are low.
We now extend the analysis to a ballot of union members where the number of union
members balloted is greater than one.6 An immediate implication of a collective ballot is
that a single individual will not be decisive in determining the outcome. As the number of
union members balloted increases, the probability of being decisive becomes smaller.7 In this
environment, if expressive preferences exist, their e¤ect will be magnied the larger the union
and thus the lower the probability of being decisive. We include expressiveness as being driven
by the psychological payo¤ in such a way that union members experience a psychological payo¤
from their decision, even if that decision is not the one that is reached by the union overall.
In other words, they may receive direct expressive utility from their choice, as well as indirect
instrumental utility from the outcome. Assume there is a vote on whether to strike or not.
We assume that each members expressiveness is given by a parameter  2 [0; 1]. When  = 0
the members are not expressive, but purely instrumental in their outlook towards any wage
o¤er. In this case, for an individual to obtain utility from choosing to hurt the employer, the
employer must actually be hurt. In contrast, at the extreme  = 1, the members are fully
expressive. In this case, a member will receive utility from their choice to hurt the employer
even if the employer is not actually hurt.
Let us denote w0 as the wage o¤er proposed by the rm. The individual worker has
to decide whether to vote yes or no for a strike. Given the union members level of
expressiveness, , the expected payo¤ for the member if she votes for a strike, is given by
6The reader should not interpret the ballot too literally. The analysis we present could apply to any sort of
collective action in which a threshold level of support is required to induce action.
7On the probability of being decisive, see Gelman, Silver and Edlin (2012).
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S  0 + Nw0 + D  0| {z }
Material payo¤s
+S  0 + D  0 + N

w0   p
2p

(1  )

+ N  0| {z }
psychological payo¤
(8)
where S and N are the probabilities of a strike occurring and not occurring, respectively, and
D is the probability of being decisive in the voting decision. The rst component illustrates
the material payo¤s the individual will gain, which is only positive for the case where a strike
does not occur and the worker receives w0.
The latter component captures the psychological payo¤s. First, there is the psychological
payo¤ w
0 p
2p , which incorporates the theory of fairness that was derived in Eq. (6). The
second component is the level of expressiveness. If  = 0 the voter fully absorbs the psycho-
logical payo¤ associated with the group decision. In this case expressiveness is not present. In
the event that the union decides not to strike, the member receives the psychological utility
associated with that decision even though she chose to strike. She receives the negative psy-
chological payo¤

w0 p
2p

associated with choosing not to retaliate to the perceived unkindness
of the employer. If  = 1 the voter receives the psychological payo¤ associated with his own
decision even in the event that it does not actually come about. This means that the member
enjoys the psychological benet (a zero payo¤ as opposed to w
0 p
2p ) of retaliating to perceived
unkindness on the part of the employer by choosing to strike, even though the union decides
not to strike. This is an expressive payo¤ because it is a choice that generates a payo¤ that
is unrelated to the actual outcome of the ballot. Equation (??) can be simplied to:
nw
0 + n

w0   p
2p

(1  ): (9)
When a union member decides to vote against a strike, her expected payo¤ is given by:
S  0 + Nw0 + Dw0 + S  0(1  ) + w
0   p
2p
(S + D + N ) ; (10)
which can be simplied to:
Dw
0 + Nw
0 +

w0   p
2p

(S + D + N ) : (11)
It follows that a member will be indi¤erent between voting yesand no, when the expected
payo¤s from (9) and (11) are equal. Combining (9) and (11), using that N + S + D = 1,
and solving for the fairnesswage o¤er w0, we obtain
w0 =
p ((1  D) + D)
2pD + (1  D) + D : (12)
We can see that
p ((1  D) + D)
2pD + (1  D) + D >
p
2p+ 1
;
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if  > 0 and D < 1. This means that if there is expressiveness ( > 0) due to the decision
being made by a group, the wage claim is higher because the union members need not be
as concerned that their decision to vote for a strike will actually determine whether a strike
occurs or not.
From above, (12) shows the minimum wage o¤er union members will accept from the
rm. Note that this depends on the probability of being decisive as well as on the level of
expressiveness. In particular, it is straightforward to show:
@w0
@
=
2p2(1  D)D
(D + 2pD + (1  D))2
> 0: (13)
As expressiveness increases, then so too does the minimum level of wage o¤er that the union
will accept. We also can show that (where n is the number of union members)
@w0
@n
=
 2p2 dDdn 
(2pD + (1  D) + D)2
> 0; (14)
which is positive because the change in the probability of being decisive with respect to the
number of union members dDdn is decreasing.
These simple ndings provide the framework for one of our testable predictions: increased
union size leads to higher wages. This argument is not based on the idea that increased union
size means that the union is stronger; rather, we identify a di¤erent process such that the
role of expressive preferences is enhanced in a strike ballot. We make two other empirical
predictions, based on the theoretical ndings below. First, if there is a lack of trust and
communication between management and union members, strikes are more likely. Second,
larger union size leads to more strikes.
If there were full trust between the employers and the union members so that the employer
knew precisely how expressive the members are, we would never observe a strike. The wage
would be set to equal the minimum level acceptable to union members as given by (12). In
order for a strike to happen, the rm must sometimes underestimate the value of  and set
the wage at a level unacceptable to the union. This can only happen if there is a lack of trust
and/or communication between union members and their employer.
When D = 1 such that there is only one union member,  is irrelevant to the wage o¤er,
which is w0 = p2p+1 , and there will never be a strike. As the union size becomes bigger and
D becomes smaller, w0 increases. If all values of  are assumed possible, the only way to
prevent any possibility of a strike is for the employer to set w such that  = 1, that is
w0 =
p
2pD + 1
: (15)
Prots per worker in this case would equal
p  p
2pD + 1
=
2p2D
2pD + 1
: (16)
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If the employer were to set the wage at a value of  such that  < 1 and this wage o¤er were
acceptable to the union, the realised prots per worker would be higher:
2p2D
2pD +  (1  D) + D
>
2p2D
2pD + 1
(17)
for 0 <  < 1 and 0 < D < 1:
The issue then is whether the higher prot per worker in the event that there is a strike
compensates for the risk that the realisation of  is higher than
_
 and the incurrence of zero
prots as a result, that is
pr
 
   2p2D
2pD +  (1  D) + D

+ pr

 >
_


0 >
2p2D
2pD + 1
: (18)
This can be rewritten as follows
pr
 
     > D  2p  1  pr    +  1   : (19)
For (19) to hold, pr
 
   > . This will not hold for a distribution of  that is uniform,
but it would be the case for a distribution which is normal (supposing that  is set at a
relatively high level), for example. It is also more likely to hold the smaller is D (the larger
the union membership). Assuming that (19) holds, if we di¤erentiate the net expected prot
per worker from setting  < 1 rather than  = 1, we obtain
dpr
 
  
d
  1 + D
 
2p
dpr
 
  
d
+ 1
!
: (20)
As union membership increases and D approaches zero, this expression is more likely to
be negative since 0 <
dpr()
d
< 1. This implies that higher expected prot per worker will
be generated if  is reduced. Clearly this increases the probability of a strike occurring.
3 Empirical analysis
We now test the three main predictions from the theoretical model. First, we look at whether
managersknowledge of union membersattitudes proxied by the level of trust in unions
 inuences the incidence of industrial actions, including strikes. Second, we test whether
larger unions are correlated with higher average wages; and third, whether greater union size
is related to more industrial actions. We begin by briey describing the survey dataset, and
then discuss our methodology and present the results.
3.1 The Workplace Employee Relations Survey
The dataset used in our analysis is based on the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 2004
(WERS2004), collected by the Department of Trade and Industry (2005a) in Great Britain.
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This is a large, nationally representative sample survey of workplaces with ve or more em-
ployees. The WERS2004 is the fth in a series of surveys, and the rst to include rms with
less than ten employees (the 1998 survey included rms with ten or more employees, while the
previous surveys only included rms with at least 25 employees). The rm size distribution
in Great Britain is highly skewed towards smaller-sized establishments: in order to ensure a
su¢ cient number of rms in each size category for potential analysis by rm size, larger rms
were therefore over-sampled. In addition, the sample was stratied by Standard Industrial
Classication 2003 (SIC 2003), where Sections A to C (Agriculture, hunting and forestry;
Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying), P (Private households with employed persons) and Q
(Extra territorial bodies), as well as Northern Irish rms were excluded. The Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) provides researchers with appropriate weights in order to ensure
unbiased estimations when using the WERS dataset.8 The cross-section WERS2004 includes
a Survey of Employees, a Survey of Management, and a Survey of Worker Representatives.
We mainly rely on the information in the Management Questionnaire (MQ). For part of our
analysis, we link the MQ and the Survey of Employees (SE), for which 25 employees from
each rm were randomly chosen to respond to a short questionnaire (all employees were sur-
veyed in rms with fewer than 25 workers). Employees from all 2295 rms included in the
cross-section survey were asked to ll out the questionnaire.
For another part of the empirical analysis, we link the MQ and the Worker Represen-
tative Questionnaire (WRQ). For the latter, the interviewers sought out the senior union
representative of the largest union present in a rm and the senior non-union representative.
Interviews were only conducted if management of the rm agreed. Of the total sample size
for the cross-section survey of 2295 rms for which we have information from management,
1203 eligible worker representatives at 1072 rms were identied, and interviews with 985 of
these were achieved (note that the most common reason for a failed interview was refusal by
management). We are interested only in the answers of union representatives, so we discard
the answers given by non-union representatives, leaving us with 736 successful interviews. In
addition to the relevant answers from the management questionnaire, this brings our sample
up to a potential of 895 rms. Intuitively, union presence and therefore worker representa-
tives are more likely to be found in larger rms: only 10.3% of the rms with 5-9 employees
had eligible representatives, while over 80% of the rms with over 500 employees had eligible
representatives.
8The DTI also provides information on strata, although in a personal communication with the authors, a
DTI sta¤ member pointed out that the specication of strata in the statistics package STATA does not much
alter results in practice. Using STATA v.11, we do not specify strata in our estimations using the Worker
Representative Questionnaire because we had several singleton strata in our data subset (see below for more
details on the various questionnaires used).
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3.2 Methodology and results
For our analysis, we are most interested in the information on the proportion of union mem-
bership at a workplace and in the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions. For union
membership, we rely on the question in the MQ which asks How many employees at this
establishment are members of a trade union or independent sta¤ association - whether recog-
nized by management or not?". We relate this to the information on total employees to get
a measure in percent of relative union size within each rm. Unfortunately, this question
also includes non-union sta¤ organizations, which is likely to slightly inate the membership
numbers.9 According to the theoretical model, the size of the bargaining unit or union size
reduces the probability of being decisive and increases the emphasis on expressiveness, and is
therefore a proxy for the expressiveness of employees.
We have two possible measures of industrial actions: strike is a zero-one dummy for
whether or not a rm witnessed strikes of less than one day to a week or more; the dummy
variable industrial action is more general and includes not only strikes, but also overtime bans
or restrictions by employees; work to rule; lock outs; go slow; backing of work; work-ins and
sit-ins; and other, non-specied actions. The information in the WERS 2004 relates to all
industrial actions that occurred during the 12 months preceding the interview.10
Table 1 shows the weighted proportions (in percent) of strikes and more general industrial
actions by rm size and by private and public sector. Note that the majority of rms (around
87 percent) in the sample come from the private sector. The table shows that the smallest-
sized rms with less than ten employees had no incidence of strikes in the 12 months preceding
the interview, although they did witness other forms of industrial action. In general, strikes
are less frequent than other forms of industrial action, and both categories are found less
frequently in the private than in the public sector.
Industrial actions clearly remain a rare event in both private and public sector and in all-
sized rms, with only around two percent of the rms having witnessed any type of industrial
action over the previous year. This low incidence of industrial actions revealed by the survey
is in line with a more general trend towards less industrial action that started in the 1980s.
Both the number of strikes and other forms of industrial action, as well as trade union ballots,
have been going down, though the incidence varies across industries and regions inthe UK,
and there have been several short-lived positive peaks in labour disputes (i.e. in 1996, 2002
and 2007). The year 2004 however did not prove to be exceptional, but rather conrmed the
decline: it had the lowest number of stoppages (130) on record at the time, though 2005 and
2009 have seen even fewer stoppages, with 116 and 98, respectively. The total of working
9The WRQ has a similar question (wbpropme"), which however only considers membership in the largest
union, disregarding possible smaller unions present in a rm. In addition, using the WRQ information sub-
stantially reduces the sample size. Results are similar, though statistically weaker (available upon request).
10According to question gactio" in the MQ.
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days lost to strikes in 2004 (905000) was however above the 1990s average of 660 000, but still
considerably lower than the averages for the 1980s (7.2 million) and the 1970s (12.9 million)
(Hale 2010). This observation of a decreasing trend in industrial actions is echoed in the trade
union membership numbers. Union membership in the United Kingdom peaked in 1979 and
has been on the decline ever since, though the tendency has been less severe since the mid-
1990s and varies between industries and genders (note that trade union membership among
women has been increasing and recently surpassed male membership numbers). Between 2000
and 2010, trade union membership decreased by around 3 percent in England, Scotland and
Northern Ireland, and by 5 percent in Wales (Achur 2010).
The rst theoretical point to be tested considers employersknowledge of union members
attitudes and trust levels. The assumption is that the more ignorant" the employer is
regarding union members attitudes, and particularly their level of emotionality, the more
likely she is to make a wage o¤er that will lead union members to call for industrial action. It
is obviously di¢ cult to capture the level of ignorance of the employer or an attitudinal concept
as challenging to dene as trust". However, the WERS2004 asks some questions that focus
on the relations between management and unions and o¤er a unique insight into employers
information and trust levels vis à vis unions. The relevant question that seeks to measure
the level of mutual trust between the two sides was asked both of employers (i.e., managers)
and union representatives. We can therefore test the rst point by looking at the response
to the question: Managers (union representatives) here can be trusted to act with honesty
and integrity in their dealings with union representatives (management)." The responses were
originally recorded from strongly agree" to strongly disagree"; we recode them into trust"
(strongly agree" and agree") and mistrust" (disagree" and strongly disagree").11
An initial, straightforward way to approach the question is to simply look at mean esti-
mates of managersmistrust levels by type of industrial action.12 The results are shown in
the second column of Table 2. Managersmistrust levels appear to be higher in rms where
there was no strike (upper panel), and at the same time where there was some other form of
industrial action (lower panel). The result is curious and may be explained by the rare-event
nature of strikes; however, the di¤erence in mistrust levels is statistically insignicant.
An alternative strategy for measuring this asymmetry in knowledge and trust levels is
to explicitly compare both sidesresponses. We assume that ignorance is higher where the
responses do not coincide, i.e., where one side unilaterally trusts (mistrusts) the other. Such
a disparity in attitudes should leave more room for misinterpretations and therefore proposals
from management to unions that prove unacceptable to the latter. In turn, it should lead to
more industrial action by unions. Put di¤erently, industrial action should be more frequent in
11The neutral response of neither" is coded as non-trust" (trust=0) and non-mistrust" (mistrust=0),
respectively.
12Of the 812 rm managers who responded to the question, 47 (5.8%) responded that they mistrust unions.
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rms where there is a lack of mutual trust (or mistrust) between management and unions, with
little understanding between the two sides. We can construct two simple attitude-mismatch
dummy variables by taking the absolute value of the di¤erence between the trust (mistrust)
level expressed by management and union representative of a given rm. If the two attitudes
coincide, the dummy will be equal to zero; if there is a mismatch, the dummy will take a
value of one.13 The third and fourth columns of Table 2 show the mean estimates of the level
of mismatch in trust and mistrust levels by type of industrial action, respectively. What we
see is that there is indeed a higher mismatch in the trust and mistrust levels in rms that
witnessed industrial actions (lower panel). However, the di¤erence though seemingly large
particularly for mistrust  is not statistically signicant, falling within the 30% signicance
range. As regards the narrow category of strikes only, the upper panel shows that the trust
and mistrust mismatches between management and unions are actually higher when there are
no strikes, though again the di¤erence is not statistically signicant.
The evidence for the rst prediction is suggestive for general industrial actions, but overall
rather weak, possibly due to the di¢ culty of measuring attitudes and the small number of
rms from the total sample for which we have responses from both sides.
The second question derived from the theoretical model is whether larger unions, i.e.,
workplaces with a larger union membership among their employees and therefore higher ex-
pressiveness, are able to generate higher wages for union members. Unfortunately, the WERS
2004 does not provide detailed wage data for all employees, but only for the 25 (or less)
employees surveyed in the SE in the form of weekly wage brackets.14 We link the SE to the
MQ, take the mid-point of the weekly wage brackets, and aggregate the information from
separate questionnaires from one single rm to arrive at two di¤erent rm-level average wage
measures: the mean and median weekly wages within each rm. We show results for both
dependent variables according to the following OLS regression:
Wi =   unionsizei +   Vi + i; (21)
where Wi indicates the (natural logarithm of) average (i.e., mean or median) weekly wages in
rm i. As described above, we construct a variable named unionsize based on information in
the MQ. Vi is a vector of control variables. The rst set of controls includes rm characteristics
such as Standard Industrial Classication (SIC 2003) and rm size dummies,15 the share
of women in the total workforce, and the share of managers and senior o¢ cials (percent
13For the 673 rms for which we have responses from both sides, 287 (42.6 %) show a mismatch in trust
levels (one side unilaterally trusts the other), and 130 (19.3 %) a mismatch in mistrust levels.
14The weekly wage brackets are as follows: £ 50 or less; £ 51-£ 80; £ 81-£ 110; £ 111-£ 140: £ 141-£ 180; £ 181-
£ 220; £ 221-£ 260; £ 261-£ 310; £ 311-£ 360; £ 361-£ 430; £ 431-£ 540; £ 541-£ 680; £ 681-£ 870; and £ 871 or more.
15Firm sizes range from 5-9 employees; 10-24; 25-49; 50-99; 100-199; 200-499; 500-999; 1000-1999; and 2000
and over. The SIC 2003 codes include Manufacturing (D); Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (E); Construction
(F); Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles, Motorcycles and Personal and Household Goods
(G); Hotels and Restaurants (H); Transport, Storage and Communication (I); Financial Intermediation (J);
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managers) as a rough proxy for the number of the most highly-qualied and likely most
highly-paid workers. We also include the share of employees made redundant during the
past 12 months (redundancies), which points towards possible (nancial) di¢ culties the rm
may be undergoing and the tensions these may cause among employees. Such di¢ culties may
negatively a¤ect the average wage levels. We also add dummy variables for private sector and
stock-market listing.  is the error term.
The results are shown in Table 3. Both measures of average wages have the expected pos-
itive relationship with union size, with the association being particularly robust for median
wages (Panel B). As union size goes up, the average wage in a rm increases, as well. The
economic impact uctuates from relatively large when we consider the parsimonious speci-
cations in column (1), to relatively small: the beta coe¢ cients for an increase of one standard
deviation in union size (around 33.7 percent) on mean wages lie between 0.07 and 0.22.16 For
median wages, they range from 0.06 to 0.19.17 These results conrm the theoretical predic-
tion of a positive link. We argue that at least part of this relationship is due to the e¤ect of
expressive behaviour, and not only to the traditional union (bargaining) power e¤ect. How-
ever, it is di¢ cult to exclude the latter e¤ect given the absence of an alternative measure of
expressiveness.
Looking at the additional variables, a higher percentage of managers in the total workforce
is associated with higher average weekly wages, while a higher percentage of women is linked
to lower average wages. Both ndings are consistent with expectations. Interestingly, a large
number of redundancies over the previous 12 months is robustly associated with higher rather
than lower average wages, while private sector rms and those with a stock-market listing
tend to have lower average wages.
The third and nal test regards the theoretical prediction that larger unions (and there-
fore potentially more expressiveness) will be associated with more strikes and other forms of
industrial actions. In the absence of the standard source of asymmetric information (namely
regarding rm protability), we would not expect union size our measure for expressiveness
to have any inuence on the incidence of industrial actions. If, however, union size a¤ects
the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions even once we control for the standard
type of asymmetric information, then we would have evidence that expressiveness matters".
Table 4 shows a comparison in the mean union size for rms by type of industrial action. We
note a remarkable di¤erence: the mean union size is indeed signicantly larger both in rms
that have witnessed strikes and in rms that have seen industrial actions in general during
the previous twelve months. In rms that have seen a strike, union size is roughly ve times
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities (K); Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social
Security (L); Education (M); Health and Social Work (N), and Other Community, Social and Personal Service
Activities (O).
16Calculated from (33:7  0:003)=0:46 and (33:7  0:001)=0:46, respectively.
17Calculated from (33:7  0:003)=0:52 and (33:7  0:001)=0:52, respectively.
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larger than in rms that have not seen any strike. Union size in rms that have experienced
any type of industrial action is around four times larger. In order to further investigate this
point, we perform logit estimations according to the following equation:
Yi =   unionsizei +  Xi + i; (22)
where Yi is either strike or general industrial action in rm i. unionsize is the proportion
of union membership among the rms employees as described above, and Xi is a vector
of control variables, including several variables conventionally used in the strike literature.
These can be divided into three categories: workplace characteristics, measures of asymmetric
information, and information on previous industrial disputes. In the rst category we have
a dummy variable for whether a rm is formally private or public; the proportion of women
in the total workforce; and controls for rm size and the SIC 2003 of the rm. The second
category includes several variables that aim to control for the possible impact of asymmetric
information on the protability of a rm as an alternative explanation for the incidence of
strikes and other forms of industrial action. These are a dummy variable for whether a rm
is listed on a stock exchange, according to the reasoning that listed companies are required to
publish more information on their nancial situation and should therefore be less likely to see
industrial actions; a dummy for whether a rm is part of a larger organisation with several
plants in Great Britain (multiplant), under the assumption that multi-plant organisations
have less information exchange than organisations with only one plant (see e.g., Godard 1992;
Ingram et al. 1993); and whether senior managers meet with the entire workforce, for example
to communicate workplace changes (meetings). Information on previous disputes includes a
dummy for whether the rm witnessed any collective disputes over pay or conditions with any
group of workers during the previous year; a dummy for signicant disruptions su¤ered because
of industrial actions in another organisation (i.e., a contagion e¤ect termed disruptions); and
the share of employees made redundant during the past 12 months (redundancies). i is the
error term.
The results are shown in Table 5. We see that union size has a positive and signicant
inuence both on the likelihood of observing a strike (Panel A) and of witnessing any type
of industrial action (Panel B). This conrms the ndings from the simple means comparison
in Table 4. Moreover, the magnitude of the coe¢ cients remains relatively consistent with the
addition of the control variables, suggesting that they are quite precisely estimated. However,
the size of the economic impact, measured by the marginal e¤ect, is very limited: for example,
when 90 percent of a rms employees are already unionised, adding another 10 percent to
reach 100 percent unionisation increases the likelihood of a strike by at most 0.3 percent (from
column (1)). Similar magnitudes apply to the case of industrial actions in general (Panel B).18
18One reason for the low marginal e¤ects may be the rare-event nature of industrial actions in todays
economy.
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Regarding the control variables, a higher percentage of women in the workforce and being
in the private sector are both less likely to be associated with any form of industrial action.
A recent history of collective disputes, nearby work disruptions in other organisations, and a
large number of redundancies tend to coincide with an increase in the incidence of strikes and
other industrial actions in a rm.
Most interestingly, our proxies for the asymmetric information hypothesis suggest that
this explanation still holds. Firms that are listed on a stock market tend to see less industrial
action in general, though the listing has no e¤ect on strikes in particular. Being part of an
organisation with multiple plants is linked to more strike activity and industrial action in
general, while meetings between managers and employees are associated with fewer industrial
actions and strikes, but not signicantly so. In short, these ndings conrm the expectation
that better information ows reduce the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions;
importantly however, the inclusion of these variables does not a¤ect the impact of union
size. This lends support to the idea that asymmetric information is not the sole explanation
for the occurrence of industrial action, and that expressive behaviour is also a relevant and
complementary explanatory factor.
In sum, the empirical ndings generally support the predictions from the theoretical model:
most importantly, they show that expressive behaviour can help explain the incidence of indus-
trial actions, even when we consider the inuence of other possible factors such as asymmetric
information on the protability of the rm.
4 Discussion and conclusions
The study of strikes has been a classical topic in labour economics. Recently however, interest
in the research area has waned, on the one hand because asymmetric information theory
appeared to o¤er a compelling explanation for strike incidence, and on the other because
the number of strikes and industrial actions in general has been on a downward trend for
the past two to three decades, at least in the UK and the United States. We contend that
strikes and other forms of industrial action are still important, albeit rare, occurrences, and
draw on developments in behavioural and political economics to o¤er a new explanation of
why they occur: they can be interpreted as a manifestation of expressive behaviour. We
argue both theoretically and empirically that a union member may gain a non-instrumental,
expressive benet from voting for a strike, and that this benet becomes more important
the larger the union (i.e., the voting group) and therefore the smaller the probability of a
single vote being decisive. The intuition seems compelling, though it is admittedly di¢ cult
to operationalise a concept like expressiveness, particularly in an empirical context. In fact,
we argue that expressive behaviour is not an alternative explanation for why strikes occur,
to the exclusion of the standard theory of asymmetric information: the two approaches are
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rather complementary. In our argument, asymmetric information also lies at the root of the
explanation. However, instead of workers being uninformed and the employers informed about
prot levels, now the workers are informed and the employer uninformed about the degree to
which the workforce is expressive. We believe that this nding o¤ers an interesting new twist
to explaining the phenomenon of industrial action, which is still far from being an issue of
the past.
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Tables
Table 1: Weighted proportions of strikes and general industrial actions by rm size and sector
strike industrial action
rm size 5-9 0 0.721
10-24 0.8646 1.356
25-49 1.601 3.259
50-99 3.696 6.52
100-199 4.072 7.997
200-499 6.515 9.561
500-999 4.603 6.644
1000-1999 6.859 12.6
2000- 15.48 17.67
rm type private 0.2088 1.054
public 6.073 8.418
total percent 0.972 2.013
obs 2295 2295
Table 2: Mean estimates of trust and mistrust (mismatch) by type of industrial action
mistrust by managers trust mismatch mistrust mismatch
strike 0.02 0.299 0.124
no strike 0.041 0.353 0.15
di¤erence -0.021 -0.053 -0.025
industrial action 0.056 0.391 0.233
no industrial action 0.037 0.343 0.136
di¤erence 0.019 0.048 0.097
Observations 812 673 673
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Table 3: OLS estimations of union size and average weekly wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A lnmeanwage lnmeanwage lnmeanwage lnmeanwage
unionsize 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
percent managers 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.0081***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
percent women -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
redundancies 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
private sector -0.159***
(0.02)
listed -0.0004
(0.006)
Constant 5.537*** 6.038*** 6.053*** 6.252***
(0.0081) (0.029) (0.031) (0.042)
SIC 2003 dummies no yes yes yes
Firm size dummies no yes yes yes
Observations 21,102 21,021 20,009 20,009
R2 0.028 0.476 0.475 0.481
Panel B lnmedianwage lnmedianwage lnmedianwage lnmedianwage
unionsize 0.0031*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
percent managers 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
percent women -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
redundancies 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
private sector -0.175***
(0.024)
listed -0.016**
(0.007)
Constant 5.422*** 5.991*** 5.993*** 6.216***
(0.009) (0.036) (0.039) (0.051)
SIC 2003 dummies no yes yes yes
Firm size dummies no yes yes yes
Observations 21,102 21,021 20,009 20,009
R2 0.026 0.451 0.452 0.458
Standard errors in parentheses. , ,  statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Mean estimates of union size and type of industrial action
unionsize
strike 71.426
no strike 13.909
di¤erence 57.517***
industrial action 54.323
no industrial action 13.642
di¤erence 40.681***
1260 observations. , ,  statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Logit estimations of union size and type of industrial action
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A strike strike strike strike
unionsize 0.0416*** 0.0232** 0.0216 0.0234*
(0.00583) (0.0108) (0.0136) (0.0142)
percent women -0.0072 0.0071 0.0055
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
private sector -0.799 -0.385 -0.142
(1.108) (1.235) (1.266)
listed 0.408 0.287 0.244
(0.424) (0.510) (0.401)
multiplant 1.822** 1.767* 1.363
(0.772) (0.948) (0.878)
meetings -0.181 -0.169 -0.446
(0.619) (0.804) (0.645)
collective disputes 2.785*** 2.768***
(0.575) (0.583)
disruptions 1.716*** 1.529**
(0.626) (0.637)
redundancies -0.0204 -0.0924
(0.0634) (0.110)
Constant -6.303*** -9.974*** -11.62*** -26.80***
(0.427) (1.594) (1.669) (2.660)
SIC 2003 dummies no yes yes yes
Firm size dummies no no no yes
Panel B indaction indaction indaction indaction
unionsize 0.0301*** 0.0228** 0.0205* 0.0213*
(0.00464) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0117)
percent women -0.0168* -0.00943 -0.00752
(0.0102) (0.0115) (0.0128)
private sector -0.348 -0.230 -0.005
(0.747) (0.795) (0.816)
listed -0.228 -0.378*** -0.392***
(0.143) (0.119) (0.121)
multiplant 1.655** 1.686*** 1.545***
(0.696) (0.474) (0.493)
meetings -0.582 -0.195 -0.334
(0.632) (0.601) (0.464)
collective disputes 3.637*** 3.630***
(0.555) (0.548)
disruptions 1.691** 1.614**
(0.666) (0.660)
redundancies 0.0730*** 0.0742***
(0.0215) (0.0242)
Constant -4.814*** -5.109*** -7.012*** -8.142***
(0.342) (1.526) (1.499) (1.784)
SIC 2003 dummies no yes yes yes
Firm size dummies no no no yes
Observations 2,160 2,151 2,044 2,044
Standard errors in parentheses. , ,  statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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